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1. Introduction 
In De Koster, Paelinck and Vossen (1983) a general form of choice 
models was presented in which a finite number of agents choose from a 
finite set of options or alternatives those that are considered by each 
agent to be “satisfying.” 
Generally we define a choice situation C. as a pair @,I-) where 
B = {bl, ..., bn} is the set of options, and r = (Eil i E {1,2 ,..., m}) is a 
family of subsets of B (not necessarily distinct). Ei L r is called the choice 
set of agent ai E A, where A = {al, ..., am} is the set of all agents. 
We say there is a conflict between the agents if there is no option 
simultaneously satisfying all agents. 
Note that, in a way, this model is related to “social choice” models 
(see e.g., Arrow, 1963; or more recently Moulin, 1983). However, we 
generally require less information about preferences of individual agents. 
We will now state some possible conditions which the family of 
choice sets may, or may not, satisfy, and which are of special interest for 
the analysis. We divide them into three classes. 
I .  Conditions onhdividual choice sets 
(i) V E  E r [lEl = r] (so-called r-uniformity) 
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II. Conditions on pairs of choice sets 
(iii) VEi, Ej E r [Ei n Ej # 01 @airwise agreement) 
(iv) VEi, Ej E r [i # j + Ei # Ejl 
(v) VEi ,  Ej E r [i # j + Ei @ Ej] (in that case r is called a 
Sperner family, or antichain). 
III. Conditions on the whole collection of choice sets 
m 
(vi) n Ei = 0 (so there is a conflict) 
i=l 
(vii) 3s s B ~ J E  E. r [E & S ,  E n S + 01 (PropertyB)l 
In De Koster, Paelinck and Vossen (1983) special interest was 
devoted to choice situations satisfying (i), (iii) and (iv). Such a choice 
model might describe, for example, the situation in which members of a 
government have to choose from a number of political alternatives 
(n > 2). Because they belong to the same government, any two members 
will probably show some resemblance in their opinions, but because they 
have some degree of personality, no two opinions will be exactly the 
same; furthermore, all members will be flexible enough to have always 
more than one alternative in their choice sets (albeit similar ones!). 
It is easy to see that, if IBI = n, and r satisfies (i), (iii) and (iv), then 
Irl Q 2”- and that this upper bound can be attained. Now by theorem 
3.1, following the structure of such a “maximal” family, which is known 
in part, has induced us to look into the “minimal” elements of r, that is, 
those elements that constitute a Sperner subfamily.’ 
Agents having choice sets constituting such a Sperner subfamily are 
very important, because each one is a representative of those agents who 
have a choice set containing his minimal set. 
In this paper we study choice situations C = (B,T), with r satisfying 
(i), (iii) and (iv), maximum Ir(, and other possible conditions. Many con- 
cepts are borrowed from a branch of mathematics called “hypergraph” 
theory (see Berge, 1970). 
In section 2 we give a survey of some known extremal results‘ for 
families of subsets of B satisfying some of the above mentioned restric- 
tions and/or restriction (v). 
In section 3 we characterize C = (B,T), satisfying (i), (iii), (iv) and 
Irl = 2IBI-l9 i.e., for maximal r, by means of the so-called base. 
In section 4, we estimate the number of choice situations under these 
conditions and in section 5 we draw some conclusions. 
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2. Some Known Results in Hypergraph Theory 
In this section we will present some known results regarding the 
maximum size of families of subsets of an n-set B which satisfy con- 
ditions mentioned in the introduction, especially the conditions (i), (iii), 
(iv) and (v); of course, an upper bound to the size of such a family exists 
only if the family satisfies (iv), that is, if the family is a set. 
Definition 2.1 Let [BI = n, r t {1,2, ..., n}. By KL we denote the set 
IS1 = r}; by A= {Al,...,Am} we now denote a set of { S  C_ BI 
subsets of B. 
One of the earliest results is due to E. Sperner (1928). 
n 
Theorem 2.1. Let A satisfy (v). Then m Q Equality occurs only 
e 
Now let us combine some conditions. The following theorem has been 
deduced from a theorem of Milner (1968), who proved a'more general 
result. 
Theorem 2.2. Let A satisfy (iii) and (v). Then m Q ( 22 ) . 
Equality occurs only if A = K [rr+2 73 or, for n even, if there ex- 
n _ _  
n 
2 ists b t B such that either b t Ai and lAll =- or b EAl and !Ail - IrI-2 - -, for all Al & A .  
2 
Note that the bound for n odd is the same as the bound in theorem 2.1. 
Theorem 2.3 (Erdiis, KO and Rado [1961]). Let r Q j-, and let A satis- 
fy (iii), (v), and let VA L A  [IAlQ r]. Then m Q (y If). Equality 
occurs only if A is the family of all sets having cardinality r and 
containing a fixed b L B. 
n 
In the latter case this means in our terminology that there is no conflict. 
A more recent result, which generalizes the preceding one is as follows: 
Theorem 2.4 (Hilton 119741). Let 1 Q q Q n - 1 and 1 Q p Q min(q,n - 4); 
let A satisfy (iii), and let V A  E A Ip d IAI Q q]. Then 
< c (i-1) If, additionally, A satisfies (vi), then 
n-1 
i - p  9 
m < 1 + c [(:I:) - (nilyl)~ a )  
i = P  
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For more extremal theorems, see Katona (1974). 
stand the “base” concept discussed in the next section. 
Some of the theorems introduced in this section will help us under- 
3. Bases of Maximal Families Satisfying (i), (iii) and (iv) 
Suppose IBI = n, and that C = (B,Q is a choice situation in which r 
satisfies (i), (iii) and (iv) such that Irl = 2”-1. In De Koster, Paelinck 
and Vossen (1983) such a family r is shown to be a so-called famil,, of 
majoritits, that is, r satisfies (iv) and the conditions (a), (b) and (c) of the 
following theorem (see, for example, Monjardet [1978)). 
Theorem 3.1. Let C =(B,T)be a choice situation such that r satisfies (iv). 
Then it follows that the following two statements are equivalent: 
(1) r satisfies (iii) and Ir( = 21B1-1; 
(2) r possesses the following properties: 
(a> [A t: ri + [A e r1 
(b) [A r, 1 A11 [A2 E rI 
(c) [A E I’] + (A n E P 8 ,  for a l l  E E r]. 
Remark 3.2. It is easy to show that condition (c) and the conditions (a) 
and (b) are equivalent. 
Starting from this theorem, it is natural to look into the minimal 
members of such a family. This leads to the following definition. 
Definition 3.1. Let IBI = n. A set A of subsets from B is called a 
base if A satisfies (i), (iii), (v) and if 
n-1 
Isp(A)( = 2 ,where sp(A) ={E G B I 3 A  E A[E 2 A]). 
In other words sp(A) is the set of all subsets of B, containing a certain 
element of A.  
For a set A of subsets of B and for Ei L A ,  we’could interpret 
{E E I E 2 E$} as the “rank and file” or adherence of agent 3. 
Examples 3.1. 
(a) Let B = {bl, ..., bg) and let 
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Remark3.2. For a given choice situation C = (B,T), with r satisfying (i), 
(iii), (iv) and with Irl = 2IB1 - the elements of r additionally satisfying 
(v) can be considered the choice sets of agents who can be seen as “de- 
cisive”: for every agent ai with choice set Ei E r, there exists a representa- 
tive agent aj, decisive for ai, with choice set Ej E r, such that every option 
in Ej is also satisfying agent ai. 
Now by definition 3.1 every base determines a unique maximal 
family of choice sets satisfying (i), (iii) and (iv). The reverse is also true, 
as is shown by the following proposition, which is easy to prove. 
Proposition 3.1. Let be a maximal family of subsets of B, satisfying 
To characterize bases we need some definitions. 
Definitions 3.2. Let C = (B,Q be an arbitrary choice situation. A set 
SCjB is said to be free (stable) if it contains no choice set of a 
cardinal greater than one. The maximum cardinal of a free set is 
denoted by P(C) and is called the stability number of C .  The 
chromatic number, (C), is the smallest integer k for which there 
exists a partition o h  into k free sets. 
P(C) can be interpreted as the maximum cardinality that a group, or 
set of options, can have such that it does not contain a choice set, under 
condition (i). In other words, such that it does not contain all the 
elements satisfying a certain agent. x(C) is the smallest number of groups 
into which the options can be divided such that not all options satisfying 
an agent are in a group. Note that x(C) = 2 is the same as “property B” 
(condition [vii]), provided r satisfies (i). 
The following inequalities are known from hypergraph theory. Let 
C = (B,Q bg a choice situation. Then 
(i), (iii) and (iv). Then r contains exactly one base. 
(a) ,(C)P(C) 2 PI 
o>) X(C) + P(C) Q IBI + 1 
For a proof, see Berge (1970). 
Theorem 3.2. Let C = (B,T) be a choice situation where r satisfies (i), 
(iii) and (v). Then r is a base iff x(C) P 2 .  
Proof. Let r be a base. Suppose x(C) = 2. Then there exists S C B such 
that for all E L r, we have E $ S and E $ S.6 Since 
Isp(T)I = 21B1-l we have, in view of Theorem 3.1, either 
S L sp(T) or E sp(T), a contradiction. So x(C)#2. For the 
reverse, let Isp(Q1 < 21B1 - Then there exists S C B such that 
S E sp(Q and s 65 sp(Q. Hence for all E E r we have S 2 E and 
An immediate consequence of this theorem is that a base is max- 
imal, in the sense that no more sets can be added without violating the 
restrictions of the theorem. 
We have the following theorem. 
s 2 E. SO x(C) = 2 .  
To prove the next theorem we need a lemma. 
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Lemma 3.1. Let C = (B,Q be a choice situation, let r satisfy (iii), and 
let x(C) 2 3. Then there exist El ,  E2 E r such that IE1 n E21= 1. 
Proof. Let A1 E r have the minimum cardinal. Now choose 
S E r, b L -41 n S and define T : = A1 \ {b}. x(C) f 2, so there ex- 
ists A2 L r such that either A2CT or A2CT. However, A2$T, 
because IT1 < IA1 I = min { IAI I A E r}. Hence A2 - C T (3.1) 
(3 -2) 
Combination of (3.1) and (3.2) yields A1 n A2 = {b}. 
Theorem 3.3. Let C = (B,Q be a choice situation where r satisfies (iii). 
Then x(C) = 2 or x(C) = 3. 
proof. Suppose x(C) # 2. In view of lemma S.l there exist 
Al ,  A2 L r, b E B, such that A1 fl A2 = {b}. Now define 
S1 : = A1 \ {b}, S2 : = {b}, S3 : = B \ A I . { S ~ , S ~ , S ~ }  is a parti- 
tion of B and, by (iii), for all 
E L r IEl>1 we have E S1, E (J S2 and E$ S3. So x(C) = 3. 
Coro.ollary 3.1 Let C = (B,Q be a choice situation and let r satisfy (i), 
By (iii), A2 n A1 # 0 
From the theorems 3.2 and 3.3 we now conclude 
(iii), (v). 
It follows that the following three statements are equivdent 
(a) r is a base 
0) X(C) # 2 
(c) X(C) = 3. 
From this corollary it appears that for the choice sets, being a maximal 
family is equivalent to the fact that for every subdivision of the options 
into two groups there exists a “decisive agent” whose options belong 
completely to one group. We also know that there exists a subdivision in- 
to three groups such that this is not the case. 
Of special interest to us are families r that do not satisfy condition 
(vi), because they represent non-conflict choice situations. A family r of 
subsets of an n-set B is called a filter, with base SEB, if r={EGBIE,>S}. 
Clearly if r is a filter and C = (B,T), then x(C) = 2. With the aid of the 
theorems 3.2 and 3.3 we can say something about the reverse. 
Corollary 3.2. Let C = (B, be a choice situation where r satisfies (iii), 
(iv) and Irl = 2.-? (n = IBI). Then x(C) = 2 iff r is an ultra- 
filter (that is, r = {ECB I b E E}, for some b E B). 
Proof. Let x(C) = 2. Suppose r additionally satisfies (i). Now let A be 
the subfamily of r satisfying (v). ThenA is a base, and given 
theorem 3.3, x((B,R)) = 2, which contradicts theorem 3.2. 
Thus there exists E E r, IEI < 2. By (iii), 
E = {b}, for some b E B. Hence, by (iii) and 1t-l = 2n-1, it 
follows that r is an ultrafilter. 
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Corollary 3.3. Let C = @,I-) be a choice situation where f satisfies (i), 
(iii) and (iv). Then x(C) = 3 iff r contains a base. 
In section 2, upper bounds were given to the number of sets in a base 
(theorems 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). We now consider bases additionally satis- 
fying (iQr, so-called r-uniform bases. That is, every “decisive” agent has 
to choose exactly r options. 
Definition 3.3. mn(r) is the least integer for which there exist m,(r) sets 
AiGB, \Ail = r, with 1 < i 4 mn(r), and IBI = n which do not 
satisfy (Vii) (property B). 
ErdEs (1969) proved: 
From the above theorem, theorem 2.5, and the simple fact that for a base 
condition (i) is equivalent with condition (vi), we have 
corollmy3.4. Let IBI = n, let 2 < r < and let A = {AI, ..., A,} be a 
base such that (ii), holds. Then 
Note that, if (ii), does not hold, we generally can say only that 
m 2 3. (For a base with m = 3, see examples 3.1 PI.) 
Finally, we give some examples and constructions of r-uniform 
bases. 
Examples 3.2 
(a) The Fano plane on seven points is a 3-uniform base (cf. Fig. 1). 
62 CONFLICT MANAGEMENTAND PEACE SCIENCE SPRING, 1984 
a 
g 
Figure 1: The Fano plane 
The choice sets are: {a,b,c}, {a,e,f}, {a,d,g}, {b,d,f}, {b,e,g}, {c,d,e}, 
{c,f,g}. The stability number is P(C) = 4. In Figure 1 a 3-coloration (par- 
tition) of the points is also given, 
(b) Kgn - 1 is an n-uniform base; in the proof one may use the following 
lemma. 
n -- 
Lemma3.2. Let IBI = n, and let A = K&.Then Isp(h)l = C ( y )  
iar 
Proof. Let E !Z B be a set of cardinal k 2 r. Then A contains a set F, 
IF1 = r, with FS E. Hence E E sp(R). 
2r -2 (c) Let IBI = n 2 1/( r - 1 ) + 2r -2. Take a 2r-2-element subset S of B. 
For each partition P = {Sl, S2} of S, with IS11 = IS21 = r - 1, take a 
new option x E B\S. Now define A to consist of all r-tuples from S plus 
constructed above. Then A is an r-uniform base. 
all r-tuples o F the form S1 U {xp}, where P = {Sl, S2} is a partition as 
For more constructions, see Erdb's and Lov'asz (1975). 
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4. The Number of Choice Situations Satisfying (i), (iii), (iv) 
In this last section we will consider only choice situations C = (B,Q 
where r satisfies (i), (iii), and (iv); and IBI = n. We will give an asymp- 
totic formula for the logarithm of their number and an asymptotic esti- 
mate of the number of maximal families. We will estimate the number of 
non-conflicting families. Finally we will show that the fraction of non- 
conflicting families converges to 0 as n tends to infinity. We will use the 
following notations: 
f(n) : = the number of different families; 
g(n) : = the number of different maximal families; 
h(n) : = the number of different families not satisfying (vi). 
By theorem 3.1 we know that every maximal family r satisfying (i), (iii), 
(iv) and Irl = 2n-1 is uniquely characterized by its base. Now every 
base is a Sperner family, or antichain. Some results are available about 
the number of Sperner families. From them we can obtain an upper 
bound to the number of maximal families restricted as above, that is 
g(n), the bound being 
([;I)(' + O(log2n/n)) 
2 
(see Kleitman and Markowsky [1975]).' 
lower bound for g(nL 
By a method due to Erdbs and Kleitman (1974) one can also obtain a 
([;])(q-w 
Theorem 4.1. g(n) k 2 
Proof. Let b cB. First suppose n even. Divide all n/Zelement subsets of 
B into two disjoint classes 
U := {EcB I IEI= F, b EE}, V := {ESB I IEI = 9 , b EE}. 
n-1 n 
Now V = {ES  BI B E U}. Mark IUl = IVl = ( ) -( )/2 
n 9 s 
(,.I /2 
So there exist 2 different families A consisting of 
elements of U. Now each family A determines a maximal fam- 
ily r, provided n 2 4. Take r : = 
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For n odd we define U := {E G B I 
V := {E C B I  E U} . Now 
IEI = 2 ' b E E )  
n-1 
n-3 ) 
There exist 2(T different families A made up of elements 
of U, and each family determines a maximal r as follows: 
n-1 ~ : = { E ~ B I  E E A ,  ( E ~ = ~ } u  
*l 
U {E C BI 
(To see that 
b E E, IEI  = T }  . 
= 2"', mark 
So in both cases we have: g(n) > 2 
Now we can easily derive 
zn-+l + o(1))  
Theorem 4.2. f(n) = 2 
Proof. Suppose C = (B,Q is a choice situation, given r restricted as be- 
fore and Irl = 2"-1. Now every subfamily of r (except 0) de- 
termines a choice situation restricted as above. On the other 
hand, all such families are subfamilies of maximal families. 
Hence, by the result of Kleitman and Markowsky (1975), it 
follows that 
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Therefore, since 
f(n) = 2 F1( l+o(l)) 
n-1 Theorem 4.3. h(n) = O(n.22 
Proof. 1. Let r be a family of subsets of By satisfying (i), (iii), (iv), and 
not satisfying (vi). Then r is contained in at least one ultrafilter. 
Since the number of different ultrafilters on B is equal to IBI =n, 
we have h(n)<n. s2 . 
2. Now suPPoseA1, .P A n  are the different ultrafilters on By 
with base (bl}, ..., (bn} respectively. For all 
i E (1, 2,...,n} , let 
). , 
n-1 
ri = {Ei I j E Ii} c Ai\ {{bill be such that lIil > 2n-2- 
Then a: Ei = {bi} . (Suppose In Ei I > 2. Then for a l l  
lIil < 2n-2, a contradiction.) This implies for a l l  
i,j E {1,2,..,n},i f j: ri f rj. Hence 
j jdi j .  
j E Ii we have: {xi,yi} c Ei , for  some xi,yi E B . But then 
j 
2n-1-l 2n-1-1 
h(n) > n. 1 ( ) 
i=2n-2+1 
2n-l,l 2n-l p-1-2 
= n.[2 - ( - )/2 - 1 - 2 + 11 
2" 
2n-1 
n - h.  [2 - 
2n-l 2n-l 
] - h ' 2  U - 3 2  2n-1 - 2 
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h(n) Our main goal in this section is to provefo-*  0 as n tends to infinity. 
However, the estimate for f(n), provided by theorem 4.1, is insufficient 
for this purpose. Therefore we now prove 
2n-l 9 Proposition 4.1. f (n)  > (1/3) n. 2 (logj(n-l) - T). 
Proof. Let * E {1,2,*--, [+]}and n -[&](28 + 1)+ a(n > 3). 
[*I* Let, f o r  a > 0 ,  P = {sl, ..., 
with I S11 - ... = I s 5 1  - 2 ~ + 1 ,  
[2s+ll 
take P - IS,, .... S [ ~ J }  , with IS, 
ls[*]l 2s + 1 . For all i L 11, . 
S} be a partition of B, 
S l  - a . If a = 0, then 
- ... - 
* *  [&I1 let 
iK!i& C S ( S i )  be the set of all s+l-tuples In Si. Note 
We now construct different families of subsets of B, satisfying 
(i), (iii), and (iv) as follows: 
n-1 
Forgiven s E {1,2, ---, [TI}, i e {1,2, ..., [&I} a 
family consists of: 
1. at least one element of %2s+1 9 
2. zero or more elements of Sp(\, \ %zl 
Now mark that the number of different families obtained in this 




Pn-l-( s+J 2n-L 
- 2  - 2  
and that they all satisfy the restrictions. Mark also that for dif- 
ferent i and s families obtained in this way are unequal. Hence, 
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(4.2) 
L e t  R, := 1 /3  + 1 /5  + 1/7 + ... + 1/(2m-tl) and l e t  
3p+' - 1 n-1 3p - 1 
such t h a t  7> [T] > 7 . 
p E M be 
Then R n-l 






< : 1 2- 
s-0 
> 1.5 1 + 3.5 1 + ... + 3p- 'A  = E . 
> R  
3p - 1 3p 
2 
2n 
3 .  
I -  (4.4) 
Substituting (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) in (4.1) we obtain: 
Note that the lower bound to f(n) obtained in this proposition is far 
from the best possible. For instance applying the same idea also to the 
families constructed in the proof of theorem 4.1 increases the lower 
bound with a factor RI 5 .  The best bound we have obtained so far is: 
n-1 2n-l 
f ( n )  > n.(~) 2 (1 + o(1)) 
However, the bound of proposition 4.1 is sufficient to prove our 
main result. 
Proof. Theorem 4.3 and proposition 4.1. 
From this corollary we see that the fraction of non-conflicting families 
satisfying (i), (iii), and (iv) converges to 0 as n tends to infinity. So, in our 
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model, all families satisfying (i), (iii), and (iv) appear to be conflicting 
asymptotically. 
This conforms to our intuition, which tells us that when there are 
many options, consensus is much more exceptional than conflict. 
Note, however, that the construction used in the proof of proposi- 
tion 4.1 has the drawback that in a certain family of choice sets the op- 
tions may appear not chosen by any single agent. In practical reasoning, 
of course, such options would immediately be rejected. 
5. Conclusions 
For 0-1 choice situations, with n possible alternatives to choose 
from, where the agents agree pairwise, and all have different choice sets, 
we can draw the following conclusions. 
If the number of agents is maximum under these restrictions, that is, 
2”-1, we can characterize the situation by theorem 3.1. Another possi- 
ble description can be given by the chromatic number; this number is 2 or 
3; 2 in case of an ultra-filter (corollary 3.2) and 3 in case every agent 
chooses at least two options (corollary 3.3). 
If the number of agents is smaller than 2n-1, corollary 3.3 also 
states that the chromatic number is 3 if and only if the choice sets of the 
so-called “decisive agents” constitute a base, provided all agents choose 
at least two options. 
In the last section we have estimated the number of 0-1 choice situa- 
tions and also the number of maximal non-conflicting choice situations. 
Thus we may conclude that the fraction of non-conflicting families con- 
verges to 0 as n tends to infinity. 
However, there remain some interesting questions. For instance, 
suppose one weakens the definition of non-conflicting situations and in- 
stead defines them as “the minimum cardinality of a subset of B, which 
has a non-empty intersection with every choice set is smaller than or 
equal to 2.” Is it then true that the fraction of non-conflicting families, 
on the same assumptions as above, will converge to O? And, if so, what is 
the maximum number by which we can replace the number “2” in this 
definition, for which we have convergence to O? 
It is hoped that these formal propositions can help better to under- 
stand actual choice situations; they have helped the authors better to 
understand the nature of conflicts and to shape their ideas as to the con- 
ditions under which conflicts do  or do not arise. 
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Notes 
For a set E. we denote by IEI its cardinal. 
Bycwe mean strict inclusion. The name “property B” is due to  E. Miller (“On a Prop- 
ertyof Families of Sets,” CompfesRendus, Yursovie30, pp. 31-38, 1937). who used the let- 
ter B in honour of Felix Bernstein. 
’ By a muximulcollection r of subsets of an n-set satisfying (i), (iii), and (iv), we mean a 
collection with [rl = 2”-l. 
‘ An extremal result is a result that sets a bound to m, the number of different subsets. 
’ For a real number x, [x] is the largest integer not exceeding x. 
‘ F o r a s e t S c B , s : =  B\S. ’ Let f and g depend on a parameter x. which tends, say, to  a (in this paper a = -). As- 
suming that g is positive, we write 
f = O(g), if f/g remains bounded; 
f = o(g), if f/g -. 0; 
f g, if f/g - 1. 
a Erdos and Hindman (“Enumeration of intersecting Families,” Discrefe hfafhemofics 
48, pp 61-65, 1984) sharpened both the lower and upper bound to g(n) presented here. Ac- 
tually they proved n 
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